Defenders across the world face the burden of responding to yet another botched code-execution vulnerability, this time in boot-time firmware used by most of the world’s server vendors and data centers.
The vulnerability, with a severity rating of 9.5 out of 10, resides in the TianoCore EDK II, an open source codebase that hardware makers and cloud providers use to create the UEFI firmware that runs during the boot-up sequence. Last year, a representative of the UEFI Forum called EDK2 the “preeminent solution / implementation of the UEFI specifications.” Virtually all UEFI suppliers (sometimes still called IBVs or independent BIOS vendors), including AMI, Insyde, and Phoenix, use the reference code extensively. Project Mu, Microsoft’s hardened EDK2 fork, used the code containing the vulnerable component as well.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-97631, is a memory-corruption flaw in an ICMP component that attackers can exploit to execute malicious code that runs before the operating system and firmware can implement defenses like Secure Boot, which establishes a chain of trust for all code, including the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), loaded during boot. While final payloads delivered by CVE-2026-97631 have no persistence—meaning they run only once—they can give attackers a wide opening to install other payloads that also run each time early in the boot process.
The Cat Has Left the Bag
The parties that discovered CVE-2026-97631—Alex Matrosov of Anthropic and Dan Holmes of Google—had arranged for it to stay under wraps until a coordinated disclosure that was scheduled for January. AMI, a maker of motherboards and other hardware, published this pull request last month that detailed the vulnerability and included a code fix. Once the post came to the attention of the discovering parties, TianoCore Project members published a public advisory last week.
With publicly available patch code, it will be trivial for advanced hackers to learn how the vulnerability is triggered and to build working exploits. Further compounding the urgency, patching UEFI code vulnerabilities in millions of end devices sold and used by thousands of hardware makers and cloud providers is cumbersome and time-consuming. Word of the vulnerability comes six days after another botched disclosure, this one involving a critical code-execution vulnerability in the PHP programming language.
“This vulnerability in the ICMP parser of the EDK2 network stack is interesting in terms of how it affects the chain of trust and the broader ecosystem,” said HD Moore, creator of Metasploit and chief research officer at security firm Dragos. “An attacker intent on compromising a nearby endpoint or server could use this bug to hijack program flow at a point where the boot process still has access to sensitive components, like the endpoint’s TPM. This could be used to break disk encryption for cases where an attacker has short-term network access (and it would be even easier in a theft scenario).”
CVE-2026-97631 is a 16-year-old buffer overflow in the PXE-Base Code driver (NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe), which is responsible for allowing servers, storage equipment, and other devices to boot using code downloaded from a local network. During this process—known as the pre-execution environment boot—the driver uses a network listener to monitor for ICMP errors. Because the driver doesn’t enforce a memory copy limit of 504 bytes, overwriting adjacent data, a malicious insider or a hacker who has gained low-level access to a local network can send an error message that appends code past this limit. The IUEFI module running on the CPU then becomes corrupted.
